Introduction
Standard price indexes are imperfect measures of inflation because they cannot distinguish between price movements resulting from excessive money growth and those stemming from relative price shocks or taxes. A central bank that does not correctly interpret movements in broad price indexes might undertake inappropriate policies and, thereby, convert a fairly innocuous relative price shock into a more profound and persistent economic adjustment. Since Bohi (1986) , many economists have claimed that the depressing real macroeconomic effects of oil-price hikes prior to 1980 stemmed not from the direct impacts of higher oil prices, but from the monetary tightening that often accompanied them.
Standard core-price measures, which typically remove volatile food and energy components from headline price indexes, may provide only a limited remedy to this problem because changes in the relative price of non-core elements, like energy, might subsequently pass through to the core components. Other core-price measures, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's (FRBC) median consumer price index, attempt to minimize these pass-through problems but may not be totally immune from the pervasive effects of relative energy-price changes.
In this paper, we attempt to measure the impact of relative energy-price changes on three common core measures of inflation: 1) the methodologically consistent consumer price index (CPI) less food and energy, 2) the deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) less food and energy, and 3) a methodologically consistent median CPI.
1 Although PCE and CPI use much of the same basic Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) price data, these indexes differ in their coverage and weighting schemes (e.g., Clark, 1999) . Hence, energy shocks could affect the core CPI and core PCE differently. The median CPI is constructed by arraying the price changes for CPI components, repeating specific components according to their weight in the total index, and selecting the middle value (e.g., Bryan, Cecchetti, and Smiley, 1999) . Because a relative price shock will have a smaller impact on the median price change than the mean, the median CPI conceptually offers a cleaner measure of inflation.
We find that energy-price shocks have asymmetric effects on core-price measures. Positive shocks have a significant, though small, effect on all of the core-price measures after a lag of 12 to 18 months, while negative shocks have no discernable impact on any of the core-price measures. Despite substantial methodological differences, our findings are similar to those of Hooker (1999) . In section 2 of this paper, we review some ongoing controversies about the macroeconomic effects of energy-price shocks and explain how they influenced our modeling strategy. In section 3, we present a six-variable VAR model for each of the three core-price measures. These models directly incorporate inflation expectations and monetary policy. In section 4, we provide the standard model diagnostics and present impulse-response functions associated with 20-percentage-point, orthogonal, energy-price shocks. In section 5, we compare our results to Hooker (1999) and explain some broader implications of the model for ongoing debates about energy-price shocks and macroeconomic activity.
Oil Prices and the Macroeconomy
A voluminous literature analyzing macroeconomic effects of oil-price shocks has developed since the initial Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) embargo of 1973. Hamilton (2000) and Hamilton and Herrar (2000) contain fairly comprehensive sets of references. Almost all of these studies focus on the connection between oil prices and real economic variables. Although our study takes a different, narrower tack, persistent debates within the broader literature influenced our modeling strategy.
Central to most controversies is evidence of a structural break in the relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic variables in the early 1980s. Prior to this time, oil prices seemed to be exogenous and to Granger-cause output; after the break, oil prices appear to be endogenous, and their relationship to the real economy is ambiguous (e.g., Hamilton 1983 , and Hooker 1996 .
Since Morke (1989) , many researchers have attributed the structural break to fundamental changes in the behavior of oil prices themselves. Before 1980, oil-price changes were by and large unidirectional. The Texas Railroad Commission and OPEC had cartelized much of the oil market, and as a consequence, oil prices rarely fell (e.g., Hamilton, 1983 [1972] [1973] prior to the energy-price shock or tightened in response to the energy-price shock (1979) . This correspondence accentuated the negative real economic impact of higher energy prices. In 1973, the Federal Reserve subsequently reversed policy as economic activity weakened, and over the next four years often accommodated higher oil prices with federal funds rate cuts. This policy generated an inflation, which the public associated higher oil prices. Inflation expectations became associated with oil-price shocks. After Volcker became chairman, policy quickly focused on eliminating inflation, and the Federal Reserve altered its operational procedure. Since that time, the Federal Reserve has credibly committed to long-term price stability, and it has not responded to oil-price shocks. Consequently, inflation expectations no longer track oil-price changes as closely as they did in the early 1980s.
Empirical studies disagree about the extent to which the Federal Reserve's policy responses explain the relationship between oil prices and real economic variables. The relevant literature includes: Bohi (1986) , Dotsey and Reid (1997) , Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) , Brown and Yucel (1999) , and Hamilton and Herrera (2000) .
Three aspects of our model stem from the debates on the nature of the structural break: First, we restrict our sample to the post-1980 period to avoid possible problems stemming from estimating a VAR across data containing a structural break. We are not interested in explaining this break. Second, we split our energy-price variable into positive and negative components to allow for possible asymmetries in the response to energy-price shocks. Third, we include the federal funds rate and variables to control directly for endogenous monetary-policy changes. The next section elaborates on the model.
The VAR Model Specification
To analyze the impacts of energy prices on each of the core-price measures, we estimate a recursive VAR using monthly data from 1980:1 to 2000:12. The model has the following standard form:
(
In equation We include an exogenous time trend to control for a steady pattern of energy conservation over our sample period. According to annual Department of Energy data, the energy needed to produce a unit of real GDP has steadily declined by nearly one-half since the early 1970s. The exogenous time trend is statistically significant at the 5% level or higher for the positive energy price equation in each of the three systems that we estimated. It is also weakly significant with a p-value of 6% in the core price equations of each system. Otherwise the exogenous time trend is not statistically significant.
The sample period runs from 1980:1 to 2000:12 with observations at a monthly frequency. Although, as is typical in VAR models, formal tests favored a shorter lag structure, we allow for 18 lags in the monthly data to stay consistent with the lag structures typically found in empirical studies that use quarterly data. Hamilton and Herrera (2000) emphasize the pivotal role that lag length can play in VAR analysis of oil shocks and point out shortcomings of lag-length tests.
Causality, Variance Decomposition, and Impulse Response Functions

Granger Causality, Block Exogeneity, and Variance Decomposition
Our objective is to estimate the standard form model and then to calculate impulse response functions showing the impact of exogenous energy-price shocks on core-price measures. To do so, we must first determine that each of the variables has a causal relationship with the others in the system and then check that the ordering of variables in Choleski decomposition does not affect our results. We can reject the null hypothesis of block exogeneity for all variables except positive energy-price changes in the median-CPI (p-value = 18.5%) and the core-PCE equations (p-value = 64.4%), which was not especially surprising, and for industrial production in the core-CPI (p-value = 5.9%) and the core-PCE equations (p-value = 14.5%). Although these exceptional cases suggest that the variable in question is exogenous to the system, we did not impose the restrictions on the sytem that blockexogeneity tests suggested. In the case of industrial production, the test results were only marginally insignificant in the core-CPI system (p-value = 5.9%). In the case of positive energy-price shocks, bilateral Granger causality test suggest that this variable is not exogenous in the median CPI system. We continued to estimate each of the three VARs using ordinary least squares even though the causality tests suggest that we lose efficiency from not imposing zero-restraints on the core-PCE equations and estimating that system with seeming-unrelated-regression techniques.
We did, however, ordered the variables in the system with positive energy shocks first in all cases. This is tantamount to restricting the system so that the other variables do not have a contemporaneous affect on positive oil shocks, but it still allows for lagged interactions. Some such restrictions are, of course, necessary for identification. We also experimented with the placement of industrial production (and other variables), but found that changing their order in the system, which potentially can affect the impulse-response functions (and the variance decompositions), had no noticeable affect on the results.
3 Table 2 presents the 12-month variance decomposition for each of the three systems. Positive and negative energy prices, industrial production, and, to a lesser extent, core-price measures each explains most of its own forecast-error variance.
Positive energy-price shocks account for a considerable amount of the forecast-error variation in the core CPI and the core PCE, but a substantially smaller proportion of the variation in the median CPI. Positive energy-price shocks also account for slightly more than 9% of the forecast-error variation in the negative energy price equation, but this is smaller that the standard deviation of the forecast-error. A similar, though smaller, relationship holds for negative energy-price shocks in the positive energy-price equation.
Impulse-Response Functions
Our impulse response functions indicate that none of the core-price measures are strongly affected by energy-price shocks. At most, energy-price shocks have small asymmetric effects on core-price measures follow a lag of at least one year. Energy-price shocks themselves exhibit a small amount of persistence with a small negative offset to positive shocks after a half-year lag.
We separately introduced positive and negative orthogonal energy-price shocks to each of the three core-price VAR systems for a total of six experiments. The magnitude of each shock was 20 percentage points, which approximately equals the mean plus 1½ standard deviations for changes in both the CPI and the PCE energy-price series. (The mean change in both energy-price series is approximately 7 percentage points.) We report only: 1) the impulse response functions characterizing the reaction of the three core-price measures to separate positive and negative orthogonal energy-price shocks;
and 2) the impulse response functions showing the response of negative energy prices to positive energy-price shocks and positive energy prices to negative energy-price shocks.
Consistent with much of the broader macroeconomic literature on energy shocks, we find that energy-price shocks exert asymmetric effects. As reported in figure 1 (panels 3 through 6), a one-time, orthogonal, 20-percentage-point negative shock does not appear to have a significant effect on the methodologically consistent core CPI, the methodologically consistent median CPI or the PCE. We also find evidence of a negative offset to positive energy-price shocks. In panel 2 of figure 2, a 5.8 percentage point negative energy price response follows a 20-percentage-point orthogonal positive energy-price shock after 14 months in our sample.
A similar positive offset does not follow a negative energy-price shock. In addition, each energy-price series demonstrates a small, but marginally significant, response two to three months immediately after a shock to the other series (panels 2 and 4). Since a shock to each series shows persistence for one month and because when one series takes a nonzero value the other is zero, we believe that any correlation in period two results because the associated zero value falls below a series' average. This would create the negative correlation in period two. The small significant response in the negative energyprice series in period three, however, may not reflect this phenomenon (panel 2).
The energy-price measures considered in this paper are themselves composites of different types of energy prices, including gasoline and piped gas and electricity. The components are all positively correlated with each other and with the overall energy-price index, but the correlation coefficients between some components can be low. Because core measures of inflation could respond differently to shocks in the more basic energyprice components, we also considered the effects of orthogonal shocks to these subindexes. 4 We found that positive and negative shocks to individual components generally had no effect on the core-price measures. (We do not present these results). This is not surprising, given that the overall effect of an energy-price shock is small. We also found, however, that shocks to individual components exhibited stronger offset effects, particularly positive to negative, than the overall energy-price measures.
Energy-price shocks do not appear to affect industrial production or the federal funds rate in our model, but they do have an asymmetric impact on inflation expectations in each of the models. Positive energy-price shocks do not seem to affect expectations, but negative energy-price shocks consistently lower inflation expectations by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point with a lag of one month. (In the CPI model only, negative energy-price shocks also lower inflation expectations by 0.2 percentage point with lags of three and four months.) We offer an interpretation of these events in the next section.
A Conclusion, a Comparison, an Interpretation
Our VAR analysis finds that since 1980, changes in energy prices do not seriously distort the inflation signals that standard core-price measures provide. Positive impulses have had only a small pass-through effect after a lag of approximately 12 to 18 months.
Negative energy-price shocks have had no apparent effect on core-price measures. These results are similar to those of Hooker (1999) , who concludes that after 1980, energy-price shocks exerted a negligible effect on core prices and influenced headline price measures primarily in accordance with their weight in the overall index. 5 We found a small amount of persistence (two months) in energy-price shocks, which could compound their impact on headline price measures. Hooker (1999) investigates the effects of energy-price shocks on the core CPI, core PCE, and the GDP deflator using quarterly data and a Phillips curve approach. We find that his results are robust to variation in our estimation technique, dissimilarities in the other independent variables contained in the core-price equations, and differences in the frequency of our observations. We differ from Hooker in that we find somewhat more evidence of asymmetric pass-through effects from positive and negative energyprice shocks than he does.
6 Although we have not tested it, we suspect that positive and negative energy-price shocks affect mark-up strategies differently: Positive energy-price shocks initiate mark-ups, but negative energy shocks do not prompt discounting.
We did not intend to investigate ongoing debates about the broader connections between energy prices and real macroeconomic variables, but our finding offers an interpretation of the relationships. We find that orthogonal positive (and negative)
energy-price shocks do not affect the federal funds rate in our equation systems, even though the impulse response functions allow energy-price shocks to affect monetary policy indirectly through their interactions with inflation expectations and industrial production. We find that positive energy-price impulses have no direct effect on inflation expectations, while negative price shocks tend to lower inflationary expectations very slightly in all three of the equation systems. We find that energy-price shocks-positive and negative-had no discernable effect on industrial production between 1980 and 2000.
These results suggest: 1) that absent a monetary-policy response, the business-cycle effects of energy-price shocks are fairly benign (e.g., Hooker 1996 and Hamilton, 1996) ;
and 2) that because energy price have not seriously affected output or inflation, the Federal Reserve has not responded to them since 1980. Understanding the Federal
Reserve's reaction function may be the key to understanding how energy prices impact the economy. 2 Controlling for expectations might also solve the Sims (1992) price puzzle in monetary VAR models because expectations could capture information about future inflations not revealed elsewhere in the model. 3 The contemporaneous cross-correlations among the error terms were generally low.
We altered the ordering of variables with cross correlation coefficient greater than 0.2, but we found no appreciable effect on the results. 4 We looked at the following subindexes of the CPI (their correlations with the CPI research energy component are in parentheses): Fuels and utilities (0.54), fuels (0.59), fuel oil and other fuels (0.59), piped gas and electricity (0.38), motor fuel (0.95), and gasoline (0.95). The components of the energy-price measures were not available on a methodologically consistent basis.
5 Hooker (1999) found that prior to 1980, energy-price shocks affected core-price measures. He attributes this to the response of monetary policy at the time.
6 Hooker (1999) concludes that a structural break in 1980:QII better fits the data than do asymmetric specifications of energy prices.
